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Yale Program on Financial Stability
Lessons Learned
Kevin Stiroh
By Mercedes Cardona
Kevin Stiroh was head of the Financial Sector Analysis Supervision Group at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (FRBNY) during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 (GFC). At the
FRBNY, Stiroh was a leader in the design of the “stress test” for the banking system, the
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP). In the aftermath of the GFC, members of the
FRBNY, including Stiroh, drafted a report on systemic risk and bank supervision, laying out
lessons learned from the crisis and their recommendations. In February 2021, Stiroh
transitioned from the FRBNY to a leadership position with the Federal Reserve Board where he
leads the system’s supervisory work related to the financial risks of climate change and chairs
the Supervision Climate Committee, a newly formed Federal Reserve System–wide group that
will build the system’s capacity regarding the potential impacts of climate on financial
institutions, infrastructure and markets. This Lessons Learned is based on an interview with
Stiroh conducted in December 2020; the full transcript can be accessed here.
Absorb the lessons from prior crises to enhance monitoring systems and future crisis
response.
Stiroh noted that, since the GFC, the Fed Board of Governors has modified its approach to
financial stability assessment and analysis. It now considers how firms interact with each
other and with markets regarding certain financial assets, looking to assess how the
cumulative systemic effects of these interactions might differ from what is observed for any
individual firm.
According to Stiroh, the response to the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic and resulting recession
also demonstrated that policymakers have absorbed other lessons from the GFC, specifically
in the way they structure and execute programs to provide liquidity and support for the
economy. He points out,
Focusing on some of the steps that the central bank took, I think there were clear
lessons that were learned from the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 about the way to
structure and roll out, communicate and execute the different programs to provide
credit and liquidity support for the economy. There was also recognition that this
shock was different in the sense that it didn’t emanate from a financial system that
had a deep weakness due to the assets that it held and the credit that it was exposed
to. Credit goes to those folks who worked on the facilities during the COVID period to
know to learn the lessons from the earlier crisis, not just to try to do exactly the same
thing, because it was a different crisis. I think when we look back, history will say that
the intervention from the Fed, those who worked on the facilities, had a meaningful,
positive impact.
Resources are better spent developing possible interventions for a variety of
outcomes instead of debating the odds that any one scenario would occur.
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The GFC, and more recently the pandemic, were catastrophic events that required a
proportional response. To prepare for another such upheaval, decisionmakers need to put
less emphasis on debates about the probability of another crisis and instead think through
the possible steps to take if it does happen, said Stiroh.
We spent a lot of time prior to the financial crisis talking about housing prices, and
whether there was a bubble, or whether housing prices nationwide could fall a
dramatic amount. You could have that debate at length, and we did. One lesson would
be to not necessarily try to come to the definitive answer to a question like that, but
ask yourself what would be the impact if your assumption is right, and if your
assumption is wrong, and try to find steps to take that would be robust across a range
of possible outcomes.
Operationalizing this thinking requires having a diversity of viewpoints and opinions
available and channeling them into exercises, analytics, and other tools. He says,
I don’t think there would be any single silver bullet, but you can do a number of things
to try to build your capacity. That would include tabletop exercises, different
analytical tools that you can use to challenge yourself, whether it’s different cognitive
diversity exercises—pre-mortem exercises is one that we’ve used, where you imagine
a bad outcome and ask yourself: Now, what are the assumptions? What are the
actions? What are the steps that might have led to that bad outcome? And what can
we do about it now to prevent it?
When designing crisis interventions, having a multitude of perspectives will deliver
better results.
It is helpful to have a range of views, perspectives, and experiences when studying policy
alternatives, said Stiroh, especially when considering problems that are complex and
uncertain, which is most of the problems that will be encountered in a crisis. “It really does
help to have people who think about problems in different ways working together,” said
Stiroh. A diversity of perspectives helps the group “think through intended and unintended
consequences and come up with better, more robust policy advice” for policymakers, he
explained. And that particularly for complex problems, when there’s uncertainty, it makes
solutions to those problems more robust than they would be in isolation.
This approach also fueled the development of the stress test for banks. Just bringing together
the skillsets of different groups was “enormously valuable” to the response during the GFC,
said Stiroh.
Thinking just about the stress-testing work that we developed primarily through
2008 and the first half of 2009—we would have bank examiners, financial analysts,
economists, accountants, lawyers, and communications people all working together
to think through these really complex problems. And for me, that was one of the big
lessons—that you need that kind of multiple diverse perspective to really be able to
address complex problems.
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He recalled that during the GFC, several financial agencies also collaborated on thinking
through how to address problems in the banking system:
I remember working very closely with colleagues at the Treasury, at the FDIC, at the
OCC, at the Fed jointly, thinking about, what are the potential range of adverse
outcomes for the banking system and how might policy respond to them? There were
a number of meetings in Washington with colleagues from all the different agencies,
thinking of ideas, brainstorming, developing pros and cons for policymakers to
evaluate.
Having other professionals with complementary experiences pushes people out of their
comfort zone, said Stiroh, who added he’s heartened to see that this development has been
incorporated into the infrastructure of how the Federal Reserve does supervision, both for
financial stability purposes and for microprudential purposes.
Having a flexible, versatile staff that is willing and able to work under pressure and go
beyond their ordinary duties is invaluable in crisis fighting.
The Fed staff went far above and beyond the call of duty during the GFC, said Stiroh. The
commitment of the staff across the system was remarkable, Stiroh noted.
There were people who were asked to do things they were never trained to do. They
were asked to work nights and weekends under enormous pressure, both a time
pressure, but also the pressure of knowing about the importance and the
consequence of what individuals were working on. Never once did I see somebody
complain or be unwilling to do what was asked. I’m sure we didn’t get everything
right, but the amount of effort and commitment to trying to achieve the public good
was absolutely remarkable, and I think that’s what I’ll remember most about that
period.
Teamwork is also important, said Stiroh. As the crisis wore on, the staff had to pivot often
into new areas, such as the launch of the bank stress tests. He continued,
People were told to report to duty on this team, or for that project, or to work on this
topic, and in some cases you had the background and the experience, and in other
cases you learn from your colleagues. You ask questions. You supported one another,
and people developed what was needed to answer the question of the day
Much of the credit goes to the teamwork and dedication of the Fed staff, Stiroh observed.
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